Narendra Modi is working for a deep state in India is not a rhetoric. Modi’s government actively accusing external deep state actors of targeting him and India for destabilization, particularly amid geopolitical tensions like U.S. indictments of Indian businessman Gautam Adani or reports on spyware use.
The term deep state typically refers to unelected bureaucrats, intelligence agencies, or influential lobbies (foreign or domestic) operating beyond democratic set up. In India’s context, the Bharatiya Janata Party has repeatedly accused the U.S. State Department, USAID, and Soros-linked groups of forming a deep state conspiracy to undermine India.
In December 2024, BJP spokespersons claimed OCCRP—partly funded by USAID—was a media tool for a U.S.-backed plot to destabilize India by targeting Prime Minister Modi, linking it to opposition leader Rahul Gandhi and Adani probes. Counter-narratives dominate, framing Modi as resisting U.S./CIA deep state interference in events like the Khalistan controversies (e.g., Nijjar and Pannu cases, labelled “CIA assets” by pro-Modi voices). Modi’s foreign policy—balancing ties with Russia (e.g., oil imports amid Ukraine sanctions) and the U.S.—has irked Western hawks, fuelling deep state accusations against him.
India’s Constitution is dynamic but has faced strains under present government. Critics argue Modi’s administration has tested its limits, but is not unique or a blunder—it is often a deliberate policy. Reports highlight erosion via media curbs, NGO restrictions (e.g., FCRA amendments targeting Soros/Ford-linked groups), and agency misuse (e.g., ED/CBI probes against opposition).
Moves like CAA/NRC, Article 370 abrogation, and UCC advocacy are accused of favouring Hindu majoritarianism, clashing with constitutional equality (Articles 14-15). Modi’s speeches frame these as strengthening the Constitution (e.g., repealing 370 for unity). Modi often counters by accusing Congress of worse violations (e.g., Emergency 1975, amendments under Nehru). Majoritarian laws erode minority rights.
Modiocracy, Modiism, Modicide, sleeper cells, and voter theft
Modiocracy is Modi’s centralized, personality-driven governance. Power concentrates in Narendra Modi and Amit Shah, marginalizing BJP veterans and allies. The PMO dominates policy, weakening federalism. Press freedom and judicial delays raise concerns about democratic erosion. Modi’s centralized governance, with the PMO overriding ministries, is evident in policies like CAA or Article 370 or Amendments to Wakf Board, bypassing broad consultation.
The 2024 electoral bond verdict exposed BJP’s ₹6,000 crore funding, raising transparency concerns. Press freedom and arrests of journalists (e.g., NewsClick, 2023); banning 4 PM news network broadcast; FIR on Neha Singh Rathore; Dr. Medusa’; Ali Khan Mahmudabad rioting at the Kunal Kamra show; Mukesh Chadrakar’s murder signal democratic backsliding.
The Supreme Court’s scrutiny offers checks, but slow judicial processes limit redress. BJP argues its policies strengthen democracy by ending appeasement and corruption, citing electoral mandates (37% vote, 2019). Hindutva-driven policies erode the state’s neutrality, with 80% of religious hostility incidents targeting minorities (Pew, 2025).
Muslims face disproportionate policing and economic exclusion (8% wealth share vs. 14% population). Low conviction rates for hate crimes and agency bias delay redress, violating Article 21 (right to life). Muslims face legislative (CAA, triple talaq) and social (lynchings, riots) marginalization, with Christians targeted in Manipur. Data (ECRI, Pew) confirms a surge in hate crimes and religious disputes. Modi’s coded attacks (e.g., infiltrators) and in action on violence support claims of mocking Muslims and lacking humanism, though welfare schemes offer a partial counter.
Modiism
Modiism is framing BJP’s expansion as national unity while marginalizing minorities, particularly Muslims, via laws like CAA (2019) and rhetoric on infiltrators. A 2025 Pew Research study notes 80% of religious hostility incidents target Muslims, tying Modiism. The Modiism ideological pull lures regional leaders with Hindutva’s appeal or development promises. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA, 2019) remains a grim pointer, with 2024 notifications enabling citizenship for non-Muslims, creating fears of Muslim exclusion via the National Register of Citizens (NRC).
Cow slaughter bans in states like Uttar Pradesh have led to more than 1,200 vigilante incidents since 2014 (ECRI, 2023), with Muslims comprising 63% of victims. The triple talaq ban (2019) and love jihad laws (e.g., UP, 2020) are criticized for targeting Muslim men, with 1,500 arrests under UP’s law by 2024, per Human Rights Watch. These policies align with the claim of depriving Muslims of constitutional rights (Articles 14, 15, 25).
Cow vigilantism surged post-2014, with 63% of 1,168 hate crimes (2014–2023) targeting Muslims (ECRI). High-profile cases, like Pehlu Khan (2017) and Tabrez Ansari (2019), involved Muslim men lynched over alleged cow smuggling. Conviction rates remain low (<10%), fuelling impunity. The 2020 Delhi riots killed 53 (mostly Muslims), with BJP leaders like Kapil Mishra accused of incitement. Manipur (2023) and Gujarat (2022) saw communal clashes, with 1,200 incidents reported (2014–2023, MHA data).
Hate crimes rose 90% from 2014–2019, with 1,168 incidents by 2023 (ECRI). Recent data (MHA, 2024) reports 200 communal clashes, with 60% in BJP-ruled states like UP and Gujarat. The 2020 Delhi riots (53 deaths, mostly Muslim) and 2023 Manipur violence remain pivotal, with low conviction rates about 10% for lynchings. It was reported about 15 lynching cases in UP alone since the 2024 elections, tied to cow vigilantism.
Disputes over Gyanvapi Mosque and Mathura’s Shahi Idgah intensified in 2024–2025, with RSS-VHP campaigns for reclamation post-Ayodhya temple inauguration (Jan 2024). Court-ordered surveys (e.g., Gyanvapi, 2024) found Hindu artifacts, escalating tensions, with 10 mosques facing similar claims (The Wire, Mar 2025).
A 2025 Pew Research study ranks India among the highest for religious hostility, with 80% of incidents involving Hindus targeting Muslims. The BJP’s silence on vigilante groups, like Bajrang Dal, and Modi’s absence from riot-hit areas like Manipur amplify perceptions of complicity.
Modi’s 2024 election speeches, like calling Muslims infiltrators and implying Congress favours them, drew 20 complaints to the Election Commission (EC, 2024). A 2025 speech post-Pahalgam, blaming cross-border elements, was criticized by Congress as dog-whistling against Muslims. Modi’s rhetoric was stated to be divisive, mocking Muslim at population growth.
Welfare schemes like Ayushman Bharat reach minorities, but their implementation lags in Muslim-majority areas (NFHS-5, 2023). A 2025 Oxfam report notes 1% of Indians hold 40% of wealth, with Muslims (14% population) owning 8%, suggesting neglect of equitable upliftment.
The 2021 Places of Worship Act debate, spurred by claims over sites like Gyanvapi Mosque and Mathura’s Shahi Idgah, raised fears of Muslim heritage erosion. Surveys ordered by courts (e.g., Gyanvapi, 2022) fuelled tensions, with RSS-BJP affiliates pushing for reclamation. The Babri Masjid demolition (1992) verdict (2020) and Ayodhya temple inauguration (2024) are seen as legitimizing such claims.
BJP denies orchestrating violence, blaming opposition for politicizing incidents. Supporters cite reduced terror attacks (e.g., Kashmir) as evidence of stability. However, Modi’s silence during lynchings and riots, coupled with BJP leaders’ provocative speeches (e.g., Anurag Thakur’s desh ke gaddaron remark), suggests tacit endorsement to critics.
Modi’s election rally speeches target Muslims explicitly which vilifies them. Modi’s reference to infiltrators and termites (alluding to Bangladeshi migrants, often coded as Muslim) was criticized by Amnesty as dehumanizing. Modi’s speech claiming Congress would redistribute wealth to those with more children (implying Muslims) denigrate the Muslims.
As Chief Minister, Modi’s hum paanch, humare pachees remark mocked Muslim family sizes. These statements reveal his communal intent while resonating with Hindutva voters. Modi’s broader narrative—emphasizing sabka saath, sabka vikas (development for all)—contrasts with such remarks. Supporters claim Modi addresses illegal migration or policy failures, not Muslims per se. However, the pattern, alongside rising hate crimes, suggests mockery to many.
India’s 200 million Muslims (14% of the population) have faced significant challenges under Modi’s tenure (2014–2025). Key legislative and policy actions cited as suppressive include-Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), 2019). The CAA fast-tracks citizenship for non-Muslim refugees from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, excluding Muslims.
The Wakf Board Act of 2025 was stated to deprive the Muslims of their religious properties and assets, though some of the provisions of the Act was suspended by the Supreme Court of India. Revoking Jammu & Kashmir’s autonomy through the abrogation of Article 370 (2019) was seen as diluting its demographic and political identity. Restrictions post-abrogation, including internet shutdowns and detentions, disproportionately affected Kashmiri Muslims.
Anti-Conversion Laws were enacted in BJP-ruled states like, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Uttarakhand Uttar Pradesh (2020). These laws, often called love jihad laws, target interfaith marriages, disproportionately scrutinizing Muslim men. Human Rights Watch (2021) noted their vague wording enables harassment.
Modicide
Modicide refers to the strategic dismantling of regional parties and their leaders in India by Narendra Modi and Amit Shah over the past decade. Modicide is a political weedicide involving inducements like positions and money to co-opt regional leaders, followed by the takeover of their political setups by BJP agents or cadres to establish BJP-led state governments.
Modi’s presence and IT cell shape public perception, framing defections as patriotic (e.g., Shinde’s true Shiv Sena claim). A 2025 Frontline notes BJP’s 5,000+ IT cells outpace regional parties’ outreach. In Jharkhand (2024 elections) BJP’s campaign targeted JMM’s Hemant Soren arrest, but JMM-Congress won 56/81 seats, showing the Modicide limits. However, BJP’s gains in tribal areas (12 seats vs. 2 in 2019) reflect Shah’s caste-based outreach, a subtler Modicide tactic.
Modicide as a sophisticated strategy, combining inducements, agency pressure, and cadre takeover, orchestrated by Shah’s pragmatism and Modi’s charisma. It weakens federalism and regional diversity. Modi and Shah, as the BJP’s central leadership since 2014, have significantly expanded the party’s footprint, increasing BJP-led state governments from 5 in 2014 to 12 by 2024 (out of 28 states). This expansion often involved weakening regional parties, which have historically been pivotal in India’s federal structure, representing diverse linguistic, cultural, and regional interest.
The BJP has lured prominent regional leaders with offers of ministerial posts, governorships, or electoral tickets. For example. Hemanta Biswa Sarma (Assam, 2015), a Congress leader, defected to the BJP, citing neglect by Congress, and became Assam’s Chief Minister in 2021, consolidating BJP’s Northeast dominance.
Eknath Shinde (Maharashtra, 2022), a Shiv Sena leader, split the party with 40 MLAs, aligned with BJP, and became Chief Minister, toppling the Maha Vikas Aghadi (MVA) coalition. Critics allege financial inducements with Shinde’s faction gaining cabinet berths.
Jyotiraditya Scindia (Madhya Pradesh, 2020) defection with 22 Congress MLAs collapsed the Congress government, enabling BJP’s return. He was rewarded with a Union Minister post. The BJP’s financial dominance, with ₹6,000 crore raised via electoral bonds (2019–2024), per Supreme Court data), dwindles regional parties’ resources. Allegations of horse-trading persist claiming BJP offers crores to MLAs for defections.
In Karnataka (2019), 17 Congress-JD(S) MLAs defected, triggering a BJP government; investigations into payments were stalled. While direct evidence of money exchange is scarce, the pattern of defections followed by rewards fuels suspicion. A 2023 Wire article estimates Operation Lotus cost ₹100–200 crore per state, funded allegedly through opaque channels, though no convictions exist.
In 2024 BJP claimed that over 8,000 politicians, including 1,000+ regional leaders, joined it since 2014 States like Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, and Manipur, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Punjab saw regional parties sidelined or absorbed into NDA coalitions, with BJP cadres taking key roles.
After co-opting leaders, BJP integrates their local networks into its cadre-based system, often led by RSS-trained workers. In Assam, Hemanta Biswa Sarma’s Congress machinery was taken over, with BJP winning 60/126 seats in 2021. In Maharashtra, Shinde’s Shiv Sena faction adopted BJP’s Hindutva narrative, with BJP cadres dominating coalition strategies.
Regional leaders are often sidelined post-defection if they challenge BJP’s dominance. For instance, in Arunachal Pradesh, Pema Khandu’s 2016 defection from Congress led to a BJP government, but his regional party (PPA) was subsumed, with BJP appointing loyalists to key posts. So is the case with Nitish Kumar led JDU in Bihar who has been surrounded by the sleeper cells of BJP.
Modi’s mass appeal (66% approval, 2024 Pew survey) and centralized campaign style overshadow regional leaders, making defections attractive. His rhetoric, framing BJP as India’s destiny (e.g., 2024 speeches), pressures regional parties to align or perish.
As Home Minister and former BJP President, Shah orchestrates Modicide with surgical precision. His micro-management—tracking MLA loyalties, using ED/CBI (85% of 147 probes against opposition, 2005–2023), and building coalitions—drives the strategy. Shah’s role is evident in 10+ state government flips since 2014.
Modicide weakens federalism, a constitutional pillar, by eroding regional voices. The Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law) fails to deter engineered splits, with 20+ state governments changed sides since 2014 (The Wire, 2024). This centralization, strains India’s pluralistic democracy, though regional resilience (e.g., AAP’s Punjab win, 2022) checks total dominance.
The Modicide state-level expansion empowers BJP’s Hindutva agenda, amplifying Muslim marginalization. By dismantling regional parties, Modicide centralizes power, challenging constitutional federalism.
Sleeper Cells
It is borrowed from espionage, it denotes dormant infiltrators—BJP accuses opposition/NGOs of being sleeper cells for foreign agencies (e.g., Soros, ISI). BJP sleeper cells in Congress sabotage from within; or Adani sleeper cells in BJP. BJP spokesperson Shehzad Poonawalla calls foreign-funded NGOs sleeper cells stalling projects, funded by dubious sources like Soros.
Giriraj Singh blamed Nitish Kumar’s NDA exit on discomfort with sleeper cell rhetoric. Rahul Gandhi (2025) accused Congress leaders of being BJP sleeper cells; Uttarakhand Congress chief (2022) claimed BJP infiltration.
Voter-Theft
Voter theft or vote Chori alleges systematic fraud via EVM tampering, bogus voter lists like ghost voters, deletions of genuine ones, inflated turnouts, fake IDs, multiple votes per person, booth-level rigging. Maharashtra surges (8-50% in 5 months), Varanasi duplicates (e.g., one woman with 4 IDs), deletions of 1 lakh+ voters. Elections of 2019 rigged via EVMs; 2023 Karnataka bulk IDs in lakes). Millions affected—e.g., 2024 Delhi/Maharashtra with unverifiable voters. In 2025 amendments limit CCTV access, fuelling suspicion. Ashoka University prof Sabyasachi Das’s 2019 paper on surgical fraud (swing seats) was contested but not debunked. Now Special Intensive Revision of voter lists substantiates the voter theft voices.
The Conclusion
The term deep state typically refers to unelected bureaucrats, intelligence agencies, or influential lobbies (foreign or domestic) operating beyond democratic oversight. In India’s context, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has repeatedly accused the U.S. State Department, USAID, and Soros-linked groups of forming a deep state conspiracy to undermine India.
Modiocracy is Modi’s centralized, personality-driven governance. Power concentrates in Narendra Modi and Amit Shah, marginalizing BJP veterans and allies. The PMO dominates policy, weakening federalism. Press freedom and judicial delays raise concerns about democratic erosion. Modi’s centralized governance, with the PMO overriding ministries, is evident in policies like CAA or Article 370 or Amendments to Wakf Board, bypassing broad consultation.
Modiism is framing BJP’s expansion as national unity while marginalizing minorities, particularly Muslims, via laws like CAA (2019) and rhetoric on infiltrators. A 2025 Pew Research study notes 80% of religious hostility incidents target Muslims, tying Modiism.
Modicide refers to the strategic dismantling of regional parties and their leaders in India by Narendra Modi and Amit Shah over the past decade. Modicide is a political weedicide involving inducements like positions and money to co-opt regional leaders, followed by the takeover of their political setups by BJP agents or cadres to establish BJP-led state governments.
Sleeper cell is borrowed from espionage, it denotes dormant infiltrators—BJP accuses opposition/NGOs of being sleeper cells for foreign agencies (e.g., Soros, ISI). BJP sleeper cells in Congress sabotage from within; or Adani “sleeper cells” in BJP.
Voter theft or vote Chori alleges systematic fraud via EVM tampering, bogus voter lists like ghost voters, deletions of genuine ones, inflated turnouts, fake IDs, multiple votes per person, booth-level rigging.